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Food safety is concerned with preventing animal products, not fit for human 
consumption, reaching consumers.  It is also an important component of food market 
development (Unnevehr and Hirschhorn, 2000).  Animal and plant health and food 
safety issues arise because of incomplete information for food safety or for animal and 
plant health. Problems may be exacerbated by the failure of market forces to properly 
signal consumer demand to producers. Imperfect information arises when consumers 
are only partially aware of the hazards associated with the production and 
consumption of a good particularly where it involves protecting consumers from 
unseen or hidden threats like mad cow disease. 
 
Government intervention can be seen as a way to reduce the social costs engendered 
by poor quality food (Hirshhorn, Unnevehr and Narrod, 1999).  Food safety 
programmes monitor and manage the production, feeding, slaughter, and inspection of 
farm animals and animal products from farm to consumption (Blaha, 1999; CEC,  
2000; WHO, 2000; Thurnham and Roberts, 2000).  In the past, Governments have put 
in place appropriate public health and animal health measures that have monitored 
animal disease status, zoonotic pathogens, feed contaminants, and problems of food 
hygiene and proper storage (Leighton and Douglas, 1910; Schonherr, 1991; Hughes, 
1991).  Generally, departmental perspectives on disease control and safe food 
production drove such systems.  More recently, mixed public/private sector efforts are 
taking responsibility for different aspects of the safe food chain and consumer and 
environmental advocacy groups have commenced playing an increasing and quite 
vocal role in articulating the public expectation for safe food (Hirschhorn et al, op cit;  
Umali, Feder and de Haan, 1992).   
 
This comes at a time when, well-publicised food-safety issues seem to occur on a 
disturbingly regular basis. Examples of such issues are the 1999 Dioxin and PCB 
contamination of Belgian meat and poultry products, the world-wide outbreaks of the 
verotoxin producing E coli 0157:H7 food poisoning, and the BSE or mad cow disease 
outbreaks in the UK and other member states of the European Union.  And, while 
arguably, whether of food safety importance or not, the use of GMOs in the human 
food chain. 
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Governments have mandated `good agricultural practices' and `good manufacturing 
practices' that focus on the shared management of hazards through the food production 
chain (MOH/MAF, 2000; Watson, 2000).  They have banned or placed moratoria on 
the agricultural application of certain technologies, e.g. hormonal growth promotants 
and GM foods, and established dedicated Food Safety Agencies to provide a 
comprehensive overview of food safety, `from farm to plate' (Ellard, 1999; Birchard, 
2000; Watson, op. cit.). 
 
In terms of the GATT (1947), human health issues were seen as necessary exceptions 
to proposed rules for the reduction of quantitative restrictions and tariffs on trade 
(Article XX). Contracting parties may adopt or enforce any measures necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life, among others. This approach has now been 
supplemented by much broader national and international programs driven by 
consumer and environmental concerns, as well as by new developments in agricultural 
technology. For example, WHO in a situation analysis of its Food Safety Programme, 
talks of emerging problems such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), 
verotoxigenic Escherichia coli, multidrug resistant strains of bacteria, and genetically 
modified (GM) organisms as creating additional concerns among both the public and 
decision makers (http://www.who.it/programmes/foodsafety).  The WHO has recently 
announced an enhanced program on food safety concerns involving the provision of 
sound scientific advice to member states and the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(WHO, 2000).   
 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity has set in motion the 
development of a multi-lateral agreement regulating biotechnology, trade and transfer 
of living modified organisms.  In January 2000, 130 countries agreed on language for 
a Protocol on Biosafety, regulating biotechnology transfer and trade in GM products.  
The protocol raises questions about how it will relate to the WTO and how its 
approach to risk assessment differs from the SPS agreement.  While applying largely 
to the trade in GMOs related to plant species, the protocol applies to animal products 
as well.  
 
These new policy trends raise important issues of trade discrimination.  Just when the 
Uruguay Round established a defined role for science-based health and safety 
measures, perceptions of acceptable safety limits have shifted towards a zero-based 
approach to risk.  In the wider scheme of things, trade in agricultural products will be 
more difficult and more costly in compliance terms for all players. There will be a 
continuation of the trend to discriminate against imports in the name of consumerism.  
It may be that the measures proposed are not consistent with the SPS Agreement.  
Standards are a movable barrier that can be moved up and down by the relevant 
authorities to control the flow of imported goods.  Supplying countries will have to 
invest large sums of money in order to meet the standards laid down.  Protectionism 
has a new ally in the consumer and environmental lobbies.  
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE GATT 
 
In devising rules for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
explicit recognition was made of the need for countries to maintain sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards.  While the general aim was to encourage trade by the 
reduction of quantitative restrictions and tariffs, it was recognised that domestic policy 4 
measures that maintain human and animal health should be seen as exceptions to the 
new rules. Article XX provides: 
  Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner  
  which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination  
  between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction  
  on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent  
  the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:......... 
  (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;....(g) relating to  
  the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made  
  effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or  
  consumption; ...         (GATT 1986, pp.37-38). 
 
Thus the GATT Articles recognise that animal and human health measures are 
legitimate domestic policy objectives, and also state the same standards must apply to 
imports from other countries as apply domestically.  
 
In the Uruguay Round of the GATT a common set of rules and disciplines was 
adopted to guide the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (The 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures)
1.  In the language of international 
diplomacy, greater `transparency' in these measures was sought in the sense that 
countries could achieve a greater understanding of other countries' problems and 
acceptance of a set of common standards.  Greater international `harmonisation' of 
standards, rules and procedures using the international scientific organisations would 
produce trade benefits and reduce disputes (see Appendix 1).  Better frameworks for 
consultation and dispute settlement would also assist.  Acceptance of `equivalence' 
whereby countries would be able to adopt different measures providing they achieve 
the same objectives was sought and agreed.  
 
It was thus agreed that trading opportunities between countries could be improved if 
individual countries could agree on a common set of rules for the conduct of trade.  
Rules provide common reference points and assist arbitration between countries in 
cases of conflict.  At the same time, Article XX made clear that justifiable domestic 
measures associated with human and animal health constituted a general exception to 
the original rules of the 1947 GATT. Policy makers should be alert, however, to any 
measures that are introduced that are simply a disguised form of protection (Runge, 
1990).  
 
Research of these issues is quite difficult and very little on meat products has been 
reported in the international literature.  Petrey and Johnson (1993) report a survey of 
Pacific Basin Countries with regard to meat inspection procedures and state: 
 
  ...these meat measures are historically the result of bilateral negotiation between  
  countries. To that extent, they are fully transparent to the parties involved. The  
  wider question, however, is whether such measures are transparent in relation  
  to the problem they seek to contain? Is the underlying problem a true health  
  risk or a form of non-tariff protection? Detailed rules  for assessment of health  
  risk along the lines proposed in the Uruguay Round would represent a significant  
  advance in this direction. 
 
  From the data collected.....the following justifications for sanitary regulations in  
  the meat trade area can be identified: threats to animal health; threats to public  
  health; need for truth-in-labelling; meeting consumer aesthetics; maintenance of  
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  product quality; maintaining security from tampering; meeting customary practice;  
  protection of domestic production; need for market discipline; and prevention of  
  entry into the edible food chain. Within such a broad framework, case-by-case  
  studies would be required to identify the original motives for each domestic policy  
  measure and whether it was `justified'  in WTO terms (op. cit., p.437). 
 
MEASURES FOR FOOD SAFETY AND FOOD INSPECTION: THE 
TRADITIONAL VIEW 
 
Countries taking part in trade in animals and animal products are signatories to a series 
of unilateral hygiene agreements, which enable multilateral trade to take place.  These 
agreements were protected by Article XX of the GATT (1947).  In the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT, now WTO, these agreements were harmonised to a large extent by 
agreement on a set of protocols for the management of non-tariff barriers to trade that 
were justified by human and animal health concerns.  
 
These unilateral agreements incorporated the time-honoured measures of quarantine, 
port inspection, animal health inspection and product inspection that had evolved from 
the middle of the 19th century (Schonherr, op. cit.).  Trade could only take place if the 
importing country could be satisfied that the shipped products met its domestic 
regulations. 
 
Inspection requirements are generally specified in domestic regulations enforced under 
some covering legislation.  These not only serve to guide slaughterhouse/abattoir 
inspectors but also form the standard for imports of meat products across international 
borders (Petrey, 1989).  Most countries provide certificates that accompany every 
shipment of a given meat product.  Some countries require that such certificates 
include specific clauses relating to their own legislative requirements (Petrey and 
Johnson, 1993).  International manuals might specify conditions for import of fresh 
and frozen meat and meat by-products, including prohibitions and import restrictions, 
labelling requirements and certification requirements (Petrey and Johnson, op. cit.).  
As will be discussed below, these requirements are a definite impediment to trade but 
are considered justified from the point of view of human health protection. 
 
Traditional meat inspection focused on organoleptic inspection and the removal of 
visual pathological defects from the food chain (Leighton and Douglas, op. cit.; 
Schonherr, op. cit.).  However, even within this traditional system of inspection, the 
success of major animal disease control programmes could not be ignored and 
traditional inspection gave way to modified inspection protocols that reflected the 
change in disease prevalence within identifiable herds and flocks (Hathaway et. al., 
1988).  The need, also, for greater efficiencies due to departmental budgetary 
restraints, while, at the same time, the recognition of the greater importance of 
microbial contamination of carcass meat, led to the wider introduction of systems of 
food inspection in many countries based on risk assessment methodologies rather than 
solely visual and physical methods (Peel and Simmons, 1978; Baird-Parker, 1994; 
Calder and Tyler, 1999, p.367). 
 
THE MOVE TO MANAGEMENT OF RISK IN FOOD SAFETY  
 
One such system is the application of hazard analysis at critical control points or 
HACCP to food safety.  Derived from engineering process control methods and 6 
deployed in the 1960s by NASA to ensure safe foods for astronauts in America's space 
program, it is now found almost universally in the food safety programs of developed 
nations (ILSI,1997; FSIS, 1998; Lee, 2000). 
 
HACCP is a risk management tool that provides a more structured approach to the 
control of processing or manufacturing products than that achievable by traditional 
inspection and quality control: 
 
Rather than by testing the end product for failure it functions to prevent failure by systematically 
controlling the process.  It requires systematic analysis for potential risks and then identification 
of appropriate control and monitoring systems, particularly those deemed critical to the safety of 
the product.  This reduces the risk of food contamination two ways.  First, it anticipates potential 
problems or failures and does not depend only on final inspection.  Secondly, because it 
identifies problems during the process rather than at the end or once the product moves into the 
supply or marketing chain, there is a greater likelihood of resolving the problem at hand as 
opposed to pursuing a product recall. HACCP can also yield potential cost savings in product 
wastage, re-processing, or recall should problems occur . 
(Giovannucci and Satin, 2000).   
 
Within North America, the European Community and Australasia, mandated process 
controls, based on HACCP and quality assurance have become the norm. Animal 
producers and food manufacturers are now required to design safe food programs and 
process foodstuffs in accordance with these relatively sophisticated protocols
2. Costs 
are passed on to the producer and consumers pay higher prices because of the higher 
level of assurance required. 
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (FAO, 1998) has promulgated the concept of 
HACCP.  Recognising the importance of HACCP to food control, the 20th session of 
the Commission adopted Guidelines for the application of the Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Point system.  FAO notes that the application of HACCP is 
compatible with the implementation of quality management systems, such as the ISO 
9000 series, and HACCP is the system of choice for the management of food safety 
within such systems.  FAO has published a full-scale training manual for HACCP 
(FAO, op. cit.).   
 




The major trade dispute in the last decade has been the disagreement over access to 
Europe for hormone treated beef from the US and Canada.  This has not been resolved 
completely despite appeal to the scientific authorities. An even wider issue in food 
safety terms has been the reappearance of mad cow disease in several European 
                                                   
2  These measures are not without their costs. Here is what the retiring Chairman of the New Zealand 
Meat Industry Association had to say recently: "The aspect of market access that has taken up most of 
your Council's time in the past year or so, has been to do with the sanitary and phytosanitary regime. 
What I prefer to call more bluntly, the technical barriers to trade. Companies have had to cope with 
exponential growth in the range and complexity of new technical requirements devised by importing 
countries, and either agreed with or imposed by our own regulatory agencies" (our italics). 
3  There has been an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK since this paper was first presented. 
This contagious disease of cloven animals involves very strict restrictions on the movement of live 
animals and animal products. We believe that one outcome will be an early implementation of labelling 
of meat products by point of origin with consequent implications for suppliers unable to fulfil much 
stricter prescriptive requirements. 7 
countries.  This has trade implications in terms of  both final product and animal feeds.   
Most recently, apprehension about food safety in genetically modified foods has 
caused widespread debate. Underlying these concerns is the issue of informed choic e: 
should consumers be informed about the conditions under which a particular product 
is produced? 
 
In the following discussion, we use the word "hazard" for an intrinsic property of a 
system, operation, material or situation that could in certain circumstances lead to an 
adverse consequence.  We use "risk" as the probability that a particular adverse 
consequence results from a hazard within a stated time under stated conditions 
(Institute of Food Science and Technology (UK), 2000). 
 
The hormonal growth promotants case 
 
The EU ban on beef from the US treated with growth promotants dates from 1989.  
The EU maintained that such beef was unsafe for human consumption and stated their 
action was based on economic, environment and consumer concerns as well as 
scientific evidence.  The US maintained that [the three natural hormones and three 
synthetic products concerned] had been thoroughly tested and had been shown to have 
no adverse effects on human or animal health (http://www.useu.be/agri/ban.html).   
 
Both the US and Canada launched separate WTO dispute settlement panel cases 
against the EU regime in 1996. In August 1997, the panel ruled that the EU ban was 
inconsistent with the principles of the SPS agreement. The EU appealed this finding. 
In January 1998 the Appellate body released its report and upheld the panel findings.  
In March 1998, the EU announced that it would implement the Appellate body finding 
in as short a time as possible.   
 
In 1999, the EU released a report on potential human health risks associated with 
consumption of beef from animals treated with US approved growth-promoting 
hormones. The opinion focuses on one growth promotant, estradiol and in particular 
its genotoxicity, and its cancer causing effects
4. The US says this opinion is not 
consistent with numerous scientific reviews conducted by reputable scientific 
organisations and continues to maintain that the beef in question poses no cancer risk 
to consumers. In May of 2000, the European Commission made a proposal to ban 
definitively the use of estradiol in farm animals and to maintain the current prohibition 
on the five other hormones on a provisional basis while it seeks more complete 
scientific information
5.  This action is said to be WTO compliant.  The US finds the 
action unacceptable (Our italics). 
 
This discussion shows that the use of scientific opinion, as required by the SPS, can be 
quoted by either side to a dispute, and that resolution through the disputes system is 
                                                   
4  Additional information on the relevant scientific studies up to May 2000 can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health  
5 The ban obviously has effects on third parties. On 18 October 2000, the NZ Ministry of Agriculture 
announced a tightening up identification markers of animals treated with hormonal growth promotants 
(HPGs)(http://www.maf.govt.nz/meatdoc/techdir/).  This replaced an earlier directive dated 18 
November 1998, which required eartag identification of all animals treated.  The new directive followed 
a recent EC audit of the NZ HPG control program, which highlighted deficiencies; NZMAF has given 
assurances to the EU that the current program will be revised under the Animal Products Act 1999.  See 
also footnote 6. 8 
long-winded and rather tenuous. The EU is also unwilling to offer consumers a choice 
through labelling. In the meantime the ban remains - sovereignty prevails. In July 
1999, WTO arbitrators determined that the EU beef ban resulted in a significant loss to 
US beef exporters and that the US is entitled to suspend tariff concessions covering 
EU trade to the amount of $US116.8m per year ($US202m was requested).  The US, 
however, remains willing to pursue the issue of compensation, as an interim step until 
the EU lifts its import ban (http://www.useu.be/agri/ban ). (The tariff suspension list 
includes a wide range of pork products, Roquefort cheese, foie gras, prepared mustard 
and truffles (http://www.useu.be/issues)). 
 
Summary 
i.   The dispute involves disagreement on a production process, 
ii.  The hazard (in one party's view) remains as long as the process remains, 
iii. There is disagreement on the scientific evidence for the harmful effects of the 
  process, 
iv. The participants remain in disagreement over the level of risk that is acceptable. 
v.  The costs of compliance in Europe are passed on to all consumers rather than                
   allow choice through labelling.   
 
The BSE case 
 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle was first identified in 1988, 
though the link to Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) in humans was not established until 
1996.  The UK government reacted with controls on feeding animal waste back to 
animals in the late 1980s though an official report documents failures in the execution 
of those measures (Phillips, 2000). There were delays in taking the necessary 
decisions and a lack of rigour in implementing them, specifically the monitoring and 
regulation of slaughterhouses and rendering firms was too lax. There was also an 
unwillingness to promptly give the public the full facts - "a sedation strategy". The 
report condemned the culture of secrecy in Whitehall (Klein, 2000). 
 
The trade component in this debate is rather small but the implications for risk 
analysis are large.  (1) If countries can maintain their sanitary measures appropriately, 
the disease can be contained and attempts made to destroy it and prevent passing it on 
through the food chain6. Problems arise when trade in live animals takes place (which 
is fairly common) and the animals are unknown carriers of the disease material. In 
1952, NZ destroyed imported breeding sheep because scrapie was thought to have 
been imported unknowingly (S.MacDiarmid, pers.com.).  This NZ did willingly to 
protect its scrapie-free status. (2) More importantly, the problem raises a number of 
issues about how governments should handle risk and deal with potential, 
unquantifiable hazards in the absence of hard evidence. Should everything possible be 
done to avert a possible risk, however remote it may appear to be and however great 
the cost of guarding against it might be? How far should governments rely exclusively 
on advice from its chosen experts, ignoring dissident scientists challenging the 
prevailing orthodoxy, in low-probability high-profile cases? (Klein, op. cit.).   
 
                                                   
6  The European Commission announced new measures on 29 November 2000 including a temporary 
ban on the feeding of meat and bone meal to all farm animals (See http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dgs/health). 9 
New Zealand has a vested interest in BSE, as there is some suspicion that sheep may 
be an alternative carrier of the disease. NZ has a large sheepmeat trade with Europe 
and North America. There is also a suspicion that the sheep disease scrapie is related 
to BSE. Any controls of the sheep industry in the UK would probably be to the benefit 
of the NZ industry. On the other hand, consumers may lose confidence in all 
sheepmeat regardless of source. 
 
The unsolved scientific debate is whether BSE, transferable in various forms to 
humans, originated in cattle, which were fed animal meal and bone, or in sheep fed 
scrapie infected sheep by-products. The problem is found in several European 
countries, though national administrations are not very forthcoming in admitting its 
presence. Most is known about the spread of BSE in the UK. 
 
Summary: 
i.    BSE is a low-probability, high profile disease of animals transferable to man, 
ii.   The link to human disease took nearly 10 years to discover, 
iii.  Measures to reduce the hazard were introduced but not fully implemented, 
iv.  Domestic and trade restrictions were imposed to protect animals in the first  
place; humans later, 
v.   Evidence that officials advised Ministers that risk was very low; but some  
cases of human infection emerged after quite a delay, 
vi.  Should decision-makers (Ministers) follow a zero risk strategy in this and  
other cases? 
 
The GMO Case 
 
Since the 1980s there has been a transformation in agricultural R&D as the benefits of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been recognised. GMOs are organisms 
genetically "engineered" by the insertion of a foreign gene.  Both crop and animal 
performance can be enhanced by such manipulation of the living genes in a cell.  
According to one author: 
 
 "adoption rates for transgenic crops are unprecedented and are the highest of any new technologies by 
agricultural industry standards" (James 1998).  
 
The non-medical commercial applications of GM technologies have largely been in 
the growing of commodity crops but the principles are applicable to commercial 
animal production as well.  In 1992, only one country grew GM crops; in 1998, there 
were nine countries (USA, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Mexico, China, Spain, 
France and South Africa).  Principal crops grown were soybean, maize, cotton, canola 
and potato (James, op. cit.).  There are a number of animal modifications, in existence.  
These include modified sheep producing antitrypsin (which can be used to treat 
congenital emphysema) (Johnson, 1997); sheep that produce muscle relaxants; the 
transfer of an inactive gene in Belgian Blue cattle for muscle size to other breeds; and 
the insertion of human genes in cows as part of a project to develop a therapy for 
multiple sclerosis
7.  Indirectly, animals are likely to be fed GM crops with 
                                                   
7  We found a good discussion of these matters in FAO (1998), Committee on Commodity Problems, 
Intergovernmental Group on Meat, Biotechnology Developments and their Potential Impacts on the 
Livestock and Meat Sectors, CCP:ME 98/7 (http://www.agriculture.de/discus/messages/37/ccpme987-
7.pdf).  10 
unpredictable results without adequate testing (Wright, 2000).  Researchers in New 
Zealand are working on ways of using GM technology to control breeding in the 
Australian possum, a widespread pest in New Zealand forests (Wright, op. cit.). 
  
There are two kinds of objections to these developments: (a) that manipulating the 
basic genes in nature will produce unforeseen and potentially harmful effects that 
should be avoided, and, (b) that agricultural seed technology [and animal technology?] 
is dominated by multinational companies that will use technology to achieve best 
outcomes for them, but "poor" outcomes for people in developing countries who may 
be dependent on their seed products. One is a scientific argument about the 
precautionary principle
8, the other is intensely political and little to do with GM 
technology per se.  An interesting aspect of seed technology is that plants are self- or 
open-pollinated: this opens up the externality idea that GM seed might be mixed with 
non GM seed or pure lines of non GM seed could be unknowingly adulterated by GM 
derived pollen (Wright, op. cit.).  The ultimate user would then be unaware of what 
was being eaten. 
 
The sheer speed with which GM crops are moving from the laboratory, to field trials, 
to the market accounts for much of the controversy and concern surrounding GMO use 
and trade:   
Agricultural biotechnology raises a number of legitimate concerns about potential agronomic, 
ecological and health risks. The pace of development has outstripped the capacity of many 
countries to assess these risks and to develop policies and institutions to manage them.  This is 
particularly true among developing and transitional countries. Countries worldwide are 
considering both unilateral and multilateral regulation and restriction of trade in GM products 
(Frisvold and Hillman, 2000). 
 
These developments are likely to place added strain on the international arrangements 
hammered out in the SPS and TBT Agreements in the Uruguay Round: 
   
The age old question here is whether quarantines are being used to protect domestic producers 
from agronomic risks such as pests, diseases or invasive species or are they protecting them from 
economic competition?  Are product standards or labelling requirements being used to protect 
consumers or import-competing industries?   (Frisvold and Hillman, op. cit.). 
 
In New Zealand, the government has held over any decisions on policy and 
institutions to manage the problem by appointing a Royal Commission in 2000 to 
review the issues and recommend appropriate action. In Westminster parliamentary 
systems a Royal Commission is the highest level of public inquiry into any matter 
concerning administration or law and is protected by statute. [A commission of inquiry 
is `Royal’ because it reports to the Governor-General (the representative of the Queen 
of England in New Zealand) who in turn refers it to Ministers].  The Commission’s 
report is expected in August 2001. 
 
Use of GM technology raises questions about risk management and trade, risk 
evaluation and consumer perception of risk.  It also raises questions about the 
international institutional arrangements for intellectual property rights and technology 
                                                   
8 Article 10 of the Biodiversity Protocol states: "Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant 
scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living 
modified organism...taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that party from 
taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism...”. 11 
transfer. There are a number of economic issues centering around externalities, trade-
offs and management of risk that would bear further input from economists.  
 
Summary 
i.   There is a possible hazard for food safety in gene manipulation, 
ii.  Not all the relevant science work is completed, 
iii. The risks to human health have not been identified, 
iv. There is a case for going ahead with appropriate safeguards (such as HACCP). 
 
INSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC CHOICE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
As a result of the Uruguay Round and the ongoing changes in technology and 
environmental concerns, the international institutions are now more involved in food 
safety and trade. Not only the standard setting agencies but the health and 
environmental agencies have declared their interest. A re-alignment of responsibilities 
is under way. Some readers might like to see these developments in a power and 
territorial framework
9. We discuss the Convention on Biological Diversity and recent 
initiatives at WHO in these terms. 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
There has been considerable debate over ownership, control and distribution of the 
benefits of plant genetic resources. These debates focus on plant genetic resources in 
international research centres, intellectual property rights (IPRs) for commercially 
developed crop varieties, the growing role of the private sector in plant breeding and 
seed distribution, and the impacts of biotechnology and modern agriculture on crop 
genetic diversity (Frisvold and Hillman, op. cit.).  The main forums for these debates 
have been in a series of Undertakings of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO). 
 
At the same time, GATT/WTO were discussing trade-related intellectual property 
issues, the so-called TRIPs agreement.  The Agreement creates minimum standards for 
the protection of IPRs for commercially developed seed varieties. Article 27, 3(b) 
states: 
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective 
sui generis system or by any combination thereof….. 
 
The debate over IPRs for plant varieties and GMOs ultimately found its way into the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) that opened for signature in 1992 at 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (the Earth 
Summit).  In particular, Article 19 of the CBD called for exploration of the need for a 
biosafety protocol regulating the trade and transfer of any "living modified organisms 
resulting biotechnology" that may adversely affect biodiversity.  Consequently, on 
January 29, 2000, 130 countries adopted the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, 
regulating biotechnology transfer and trade in GM products. Adoption of the protocol 
implies that protection of property rights in original plant materials, for example, 
could be used to prevent beneficial trade between countries.    
                                                   
9 The World Bank has recently started developing a Bank strategy on food safety through its 
Agribusiness and Markets Thematic Group . An issue paper by Hirschhorn, Unnevehr and Narrod, 
(1999) closely parallels our approach. For further detail see (http://www.worldbank.org/foodsafety)  12 
 
Frisvold and Hillman (op. cit.) point out that countries must now work through two 
competing institutional structures dealing with environmental and trade-related aspects 
of GMOs.  The WTO framework has more history and legal precedent behind, yet it 
remains to be seen how well it can resolve thorny SPS disputes such as the EU/US 
dispute over hormone beef. The SPS and TBT agreements do not specifically address 
GMOs but many issues surrounding GMO trade restrictions are applicable. 
 
The WTO framework, however, is not aimed at achieving environmental objectives. 
Rather its purpose is to limit trade distortions arising from environmental policies 
being used as a Trojan horse to further economic protectionism. In contrast, the 
Biosafety Protocol deals narrowly and specifically with GMOs. Yet, its language is 
often ambiguous and seemingly at odds with WTO agreements.  Also, the most 
controversial aspects of implementation have been put off to a future date . The 
protocol is aimed more directly at environmental objectives. Negotiators have also 
attempted to introduce distributional issues as well. Here, trade policies are not of 
interest, per se, but rather as a means of furthering these other objectives (Frisvold and 
Hillman, op. cit.).   
 
Developments at WHO 
 
The WHO is a joint sponsor of the Codex Alimentarius Commission with FAO. With 
the establishment of the WTO SPS Agreements the character of the Commission 
shifted from a voluntary standards setting agency to one that establishes health and 
safety requirements for food which have implications for national food safety 
legislation.  In May 2000, the World Health Assembly took the view that food safety 
was an essential public health function and priority area and adopted a resolution 
calling on WHO to increase its involvement and technical support in the work of the 
Commission and its Committees (WHO, 2000).  
 
The argument appears to be that the UN has declared the eradication of poverty as a 
major goal and that people’s wellbeing depends on their enjoyment of good health.  
There will be no social and economic development where health is not given priority.  
Globalisation of the world's food supply also means globalisation of public health 
concerns.  WHO therefore sees itself as expanding its commitment to food safety by 
way of giving sound scientific advice to member states as well as the Codex 
Commission.  Two areas of importance were identified for a leading role: 
microbiological risk assessment and biotechnology in foods. 
 
There is a view (Laurent Aventin for Médecins Sans Frontières) (MSF) that the WTO 
agreements favour the implementation of commercial regulations over those 
concerning public health (The Lancet 2000, 355:580).  Health is regarded by WTO as 
an object for negotiation in the same way as any of the other 160 services listed in the 
WTO's general agreement on trade in services. MSF, in line with WHO, maintains that 
people’s well being should be ranked ahead of other services. MSF is therefore against 
liberalisation of distribution in the health sector. It argues that populations of the 
poorest countries will continue to suffer discrimination particularly over access to 
medicines.  
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WHO Director-General appeared to share this concern when she said that WHO was 
invited to Seattle: 
   not as a participant, but as an active and vocal observer (Brundtland, 1999). 
 
An invitation has been issued to governments, industry, NGOs and other partners to 
establish with WHO an appropriate mechanism for monitoring the actual effect of the 
new trade agreements. 
 
This is interpreted by MSF as a need for WHO to challenge the meaning of Article XX 
of the GATT: 
•  The right to take necessary measures to protect the health of their people , but only on 
condition that these are not applied for the purposes of protectionism and do not present an 
unnecessary barrier to trade. 
 
WHO requires that any epidemic outbreak is reported to its parent body under the 
provisions of its international regulations, and it is concerned there is a risk of 
potential conflict between respecting this requirement and the WTO’s SPS 
requirements. In relation to the standard setting activity of Codex Alimentarius, 
Brundtland (2000) accepts its dual mission of protecting health and promoting fair 
trade, but says that the protection of consumers’ health around the world must always 
be given the first priority.    
 
This sounds to the present authors as a good example of "turf wars".  MSF points out 
that the member countries of WHO are practically the same as those that make up the 
WTO:   
However, the contradiction between the interests of each body does not seem to perturb them. 
With the risk that public health will be dominated by purely commercial considerations, will 
WHO have the political and financial means to defend the position of vulnerable countries?  
(The Lancet, op. cit.).   
 
The same observation could apply to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Rio Declaration.  These remarks suggest to us turf wars in the foreign ministries 
around the world and the competing demands of the respective departmental 
Ministers. 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF RISK 
 
The adverse effects of unintended imports of disease or pests in traded goods 
drives the food safety protection system in trade.  The SPS agreement has codified 
procedures for the assessment of such hazards so that a degree of uniformity 
prevails across countries.  The TBT agreement also codifies risk analysis for 
standards and other products. The protectionist principle adopted is the same in 
both agreements; i.e. that measures adopted should be no more trade-restrictive 
than required to achieve the appropriate level of protection for human and animal 
health reasons. 
 
The WTO recognises three steps in risk management in the SPS and TBT context 
(GATT 1992, p.9).  They are:  
•  Evaluating the likelihood of a disease or pest entering a country, or determining 
the potential adverse effects on health of additives or contaminants;  
•  Determining the acceptable levels of risk; and selection, and 14 
•  Application of measures that would limit risk to acceptable levels and which were 
compatible with trade requirements.   
 
The first is a question of scientific assessment or evaluation; the second is a question 
of choice; and the third is a matter of design.  Evaluation is a matter for science and 
statistics; choice is a matter of political (and ultimately consumer) preferences; while 
design is what policy advisors and legal experts do (Johnson, 1997).   
 
In the light of the Seattle imbroglio, it is the question of acceptable risk, which 
inflames the heart of a protester. There is a lay view that zero risk can be imposed by 
regulatory means which stands in contrast to a scientific approach to risk based on 
probability. The aim of managing risk, on the other hand, is to set up protocols and 
procedures that allow importation on a restricted basis so that the risk is below some 
desired level.  The latter could be tolerances or a maximum residue level (MRL) 
determined by the standard-setting agencies or international agreements. In the recent 
case of apple imports into Australia from New Zealand, the Australian authorities 
simply set the pre-harvest inspection conditions so high that the trade was not worth 
pursuing. 
 
The assessment of risk, while it may be based on past performance involves in actual 
fact an assessment of future performance if it is to apply to some world event yet to 
occur. The occurrence of any event in the future is uncertain (as economists well 
know) and in many cases in the present context the requisite knowledge may not have 
been accumulated or explored. The environmentalists and the NGOs have developed a 
fail-safe philosophy out of this uncertainty embodied in the precautionary principle
10 - 
the potential threat of adverse outcomes is sufficient to take preventative action in the 
here and now!    
 
Frisvold and Hillman (op.cit.) point out that under the Biodiversity Protocol the 
importer can require the exporter to carry out or bear the costs of risk assessment. The 
burden of proof regarding safety appears to fall on the exporter to demonstrate a 
product or GMO is safe. Under the SPS agreement, an importing country may also 
impose a more restrictive standard than relevant internationally recognised standards. 
In this case, the burden of proof falls on the importing country. If the importer is 
challenged, it must defend its standard by presenting a risk analysis that defines the 
nature of risk that necessitates the need for a stricter standard.  
 
These authors believe that the rapid adoption of agricultural biotechnology has 
outpaced the capacity of agricultural, environmental and public health institutions to 
assess and manage their potential risks.  Concerns have been heightened by increased 
concentration of agricultural input supply industries and the bundling of seed and pest 
control strategies.  Plant technology and not animal technology drive a large 
proportion of these concerns.  Yet we need to remind ourselves that animals eat plant 
materials and that while use of gene technology in animals may be slower in 
development than in crops, the potential is still there for some big changes in 
productive efficiencies and adverse outcomes as well.   
 
The precautionary principle 
                                                   
10 See footnote 12. 15 
 
There are different interpretations of the precautionary principle (PP) in use in national 
governments and in the international agencies:  
The principle states that potential environmental risks should be dealt with even in the absence 
of scientific certainty.  It has long been advocated by environmentalists, who see it as a more 
effective way of managing hazards than traditional scientific risk assessments, which call for 
numbers and hard proof as prerequisites for action" (Nature 2000,407:551). 
 
Richard North (2000) points out that Green campaigners use a stricter version of the 
precautionary principle that has subsequently crept into policy formation.  The 
principle was conceived in Germany and supposed that where there was evidence that 
harm was likely, even if it could not finally be proved scientifically, a precautionary 
presumptive approach should be adopted.  In official and legislative language and 
operation, the principle was one of three principles which, when held in tension 
together, could usefully guide policy.  Decisions about regulating processes and 
products should be made, even in advance of final proof of harm, which erred on the 
side of caution.  But such decisions were also to be proportionate, and should also be 
pragmatic, decisions should be alert to economic and practical consequences; they 
should not impose unnecessary costs. 
 
[North says] the Greens have used the PP as a means of putting technology and its 
proponents on trial, and of assuming their guilt until they are proved innocent. This 
has led legislators to put the burden of proof on industry and the official regulators; 
that is to say, the language legislators have been persuaded to use often seems to allow 
that it is the possibility of harm which should trigger precaution, rather than the 
tougher standard of probability. [He says] the legislators have tried to meet the Greens 
half way.  They need the restrictive language because they are hoping to satisfy the 
calls by campaigners for caution. Thus a strict and unfettered version of the PP will 
always and everywhere allow a crushing objection to be made to any technology, and 
especially a new one such as GMOs.  
 
Thus the Green position only looks at one side of the distribution of probable 
outcomes of an event like a new technology, and is biased toward a zero risk 
assessment to be acceptable.  As North points out, no scientist would ever make a 
statement that a product is absolutely safe.  The Greens would say that this is an 
endorsement of caution.  But no scientist would say anything is safe, since to do so is 
(a) to fly in the face of empirical experience, and (b) betray the empirical 
understanding that until an experiment has run its course, it results cannot be known. 
In addition, there is the philosophical principle that hardly any statements are 
definitively verifiable and those more common ones that are falsifiable often are not of 
practical use.  Essentially, to follow Popper, finding falsifiable statements is a lot 
easier than finding verifiable ones.  From this point of view, there is no such thing as 
zero risk, which is what the Greens demand.  
 
We find this argument is pretty conclusive as far as the probity of science is 
concerned, but not a lot of help to decision-makers who have to decide on a course of 
action in the face of the uncertainties involved.  Ministers/Committees are composed 
of so-called practical (wo)men who are swayed by absolute certainties and are not 
equipped to interpret the idea of a probability view of risk. How can they be better 
guided? 
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THE FUTURE OF FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
 
The future development of food production systems and trade will see increased 
demands being put on both the product and the production process according to 
Thomas Urban (1998). He predicts a significant shift in consumer attitudes, buttressed 
by research discoveries that will move the traditional commodity-based food 
production system into a Prescription Food System. Consumer expectations for food 
will include standards, which reflect safety, health and the environment.  The future 
structure of the world's food system will primarily be patterned after pharmaceutical 
standards for research, production, distribution and pricing.  Operating and structural 
consequences of this shift will be extraordinary for each step in the development, 
production, distribution, and purchase of food. 
 
The key elements in this prescription system are transparency and traceability. The 
consumer will expect to be able to trace each food item back to its earliest production 
stage.  The system will be driven by heightened sensitivity to food-borne diseases, an 
increasing concern for animal welfare and the environment, and the potential for 
closer matching of genetic profiles of individuals in relation to nutritional needs. 
 
Marked changes will be required right down the production and processing chain. 
Urban expects these changes will be global in nature.  As food is produced world-
wide, the new standards will also quickly be required in the developing world which 
aspires to be part of the world food system. Developing countries may well need 
preferential access to developed country markets for some time unless processes and 
procedures are updated very quickly.   
 
There is thus every possibility that enhanced food safety standards will continue to be 
major impediments to greater trade for some countries for many years. The present 
science-based rules approach and attention to risk management is but the first step in  
a more encompassing prescriptive system for meat products.  
 
Future development in the area of food safety in meat products raises the following 
issues: 
•  Greater emphasis on consumer requirements: what are the informational needs 
to ensure consumer requirements are being met?; 
•  Greater costs of compliance: how are these informational requirements to be 
filled, what are the costs, and who will pay for them?; 
•  Greater control of production systems: stricter demands on food safety will 
require much greater monitoring and the implementation and use of more high-
technology tools in livestock farming. This will conflict with the wishes of the 
public in various countries to move towards more natural and animal welfare-
friendly production systems; 
•  Greater restraints on countries with natural advantages: what do such 
developments mean for the geographic spread and location of farming and 
agri-business activities?; 
•  Greater pressures on the marketing chain: what do such developments mean 
for future organisational patterns of production, processing, and ancillary 
services?; 
•  Negative impacts on international food distribution systems: greater 
conformity with standards in major importing countries required: will more 17 
prescriptive systems for food safety delay the development of more efficient 
food-producing and exporting countries? 
•  Disguised protectionism will continue to be a problem: what will be the trade 
discrimination effects as these changes take place?  Will the WTO system of 
appeals continue to be the appropriate forum?               
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International Co-ordination of Public Health and Food Safety in Animal 




Animal health is the responsibility of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), based in Paris, 
which is an inter-governmental organisation created by international agreement in 1924 and outside the 
United Nations (UN) ambit but which co-operates with it. One of the objectives of the OIE is 
safeguarding animal and human health in  world trade in animal products.  The Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) explicitly recommends to 
national authorities the use of standards, guidelines and recommendations developed under the auspices 
of the OIE. 
 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN, founded in 1945, has the mandate of 
raising the levels of nutrition and standard of living, improving agricultural productivity, and bettering 
the condition, of rural populations.  It has responsibility for all matters of food and agricultural 
production from farm to marketing and hence all animal production and animal food products. A 
veterinary public health management project has been established within FAO.  Its mission is to 
determine the major risk factors in the transmission of zoonotic pathogens, drugs and chemical residues 
in meat, milk and other animal products, and the contamination of food during processing and transport 
of animals and their products as well as developing strategies for the protection of human health. 
 
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission, established in 1962, co-ordinates international matters 
concerning food standards including both animal and plant products. Along with the OIE the 
Commission is accepted by the WTO as the standard-setting institution for sanitary requirements in the 
trade of animals and animal products.  The Food and Agriculture organisation and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) jointly established the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex 1993, 1998). 
 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO), established in 1947, and headquartered in Geneva, is the 
UN organisation with responsibility for international co-ordination of health matters.  With the 
establishment of the WTO's SPS Agreement and the role now played by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (along with OIE and the Plant Protection Convention), WHO has been called upon to 
expand its commitment to food safety.  In May 2000, WHO adopted a resolution that emphasised that 
food safety was an essential public health function.  As a result, the current working relationship 
between WHO and FAO is being reviewed and WHO is increasing its technical support to the 
Commission.  WHO is also providing assistance to national authorities in developing and strengthening 




The SPS Agreement provides for the resolution of disputes between member countries using 
internationally agreed standards.  Resolution will depend on the generation and communication of 
scientific and regulatory information between countries, including risk assessment procedures.  This 
greatly increased role for the standard-setting agencies will need to be tested in actual dispute situations 
to ascertain if progress in agreement on technical barriers to trade can be achieved.  Thus any success in 
dispute resolution in the future will depend on the performance of the standard-setting agencies.  
Capacities will need to be developed and procedures worked out.  Even so, sovereignty issues may 
cloud the scientific evidence.  As Hillman (1997) states "despite these misgivings about the capacity of 
the international scientific organisations to resolve NTB-technical barrier questions and disputes, other 




                                                   
11 Information derived from http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/w9114e03.htm. 